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Abstract  
Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the 
data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. 
The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the 
hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates 
between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that the 
principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step 
of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological 
tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the 
unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is 
the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that 
the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problem of whether linguistic theories count as empirical is one of the central 
foundational issues that have been discussed since the advent of theoretical linguistics in the 
twentieth century. Although the discussion of this topic has been continuous, its intensity and 
its focus have varied. Currently, the empiricalness problem is manifested in a controversy on 
the reliability of linguistic data and their capability of supporting or refuting the hypotheses of 
theories.1 The problem of linguistic data is especially crucial with respect to grammaticality 
judgments. As we know, during the past five decades the primary data type used to support 
the hypotheses put forward by linguistic theories has been grammaticality judgments rooted in 
the native speaker’s introspection as the primary source of data. However, in current debates 
the reliability of introspection as a data source and, consequently, the tenability of linguistic 
hypotheses built on grammaticality judgments stemming from introspection, have been 
seriously questioned. In this debate, the symptoms of a possible crisis may be detected, 
because some of the views put forward maintain that the development of theoretical 
linguistics has been slowed down by the problematic nature of linguistic data in general and 
that of grammaticality judgments rooted in introspection in particular (see e.g. Featherston 
2007, 2009, Schlesewsky 2009, Schütze 1996 etc.). 
The present paper tackles the reliability of introspection and grammaticality judgments 
from a point of view which is of utmost importance but which has not yet been considered in 
the literature: namely, the methodological consequences yielded by the logical structure of 
contradictions between the data and the hypotheses.  
During the history of theoretical linguistics, the contradictions between the data and 
the hypotheses have been evaluated in two extreme ways. It was Chomsky who introduced 
one of the extremes into theoretical linguistics as a component of what he means by the 
‘Galilean style in science’. In Chomsky’s interpretation, the ‘Galilean style in science’ 
consists of three components (for discussion see Botha 1983, Brame 1984, Boeckx 2006, 
2010, Freidin 2007, Freidin – Vergnaud 2001, Mukherji 2010, Riemer 2009).2 The first is the 
conviction that the way nature works can be captured by mathematical structures. According 
to the second, one may reach a deep understanding of the universe by abstracting from what 
can be observed on the surface of phenomena. The third is what the literature calls 
‘epistemological tolerance’ and considers the key component of Chomsky’s idea of the 
‘Galilean style in science’ (Botha, 1983, Klausenburger 1983, Riemer 2009):  
 
“What was striking about Galileo, and what was considered very offensive at that 
time, was that he dismissed a lot of data; he was willing to say ‘Look, if the data refute 
the theory, the data are probably wrong.’ And the data that he threw out were not 
minor. […] Euler, Gauss, and so on […] just said: ‘We’ll live with the problems and 
do the mathematics and some day it will be figured out’, which is essentially Galileo’s 
attitude towards things flying off the earth. That’s pretty much what happened. During 
the first half of the nineteenth century Gauss, for example, was creating a good part of 
modern mathematics, but kind of intuitively, without a formalized theory, in fact with 
approaches that had internal contradictions. […] now we understand it, but for a long 
                                                            
1 Seminal contributions to this debate include Borsley (ed.) (2005), Penke – Rosenbach (eds.) 2007, Kepser – 
Reis (eds.) (2005), Sternefeld (ed.) (2007), Featherston – Winkler (eds.)(2009), Winkler – Featherston (eds.) 
(2009) etc.  
2 According to a certain part of the literature what Chomsky seems to mean by this term has little to do with the 
views Galileo had. See for this e.g. Botha 1983 and Riemer 2009 as well as the historiographic literature cited 
there. Nevertheless, in this paper it is not our task to check whether Chomsky interpreted Galileo correctly or 
not. What matters is that, independently of its origin, the ‘Galilean style in science’ refers to a set of 
methodological principles which Chomsky expects to be followed in theoretical linguistics.  
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period, in fact right through the classical period, the systems were informal and even 
contradictory. […] And what’s true of mathematics is going to be true of everything. 
[…] The recognition that that’s the way science ought to go if we want understanding, 
or the way that any kind of rational inquiry ought to go – that was quite a big step and 
it had many parts, like the Galilean move towards discarding recalcitrant phenomena 
[…] That’s all part of the methodology of science.” (Chomsky 2002: 98-102; emphasis 
added) 
 
Referring to Weinberg (1976), from the late 1970s on Chomsky has put forward his view of 
the ‘Galielan style in science’ in different contexts (see also Chomsky 1980a: 2, 1980b: 9–10, 
2004: 25, 170–172). If we relate the above quotation to linguistic theories, we obtain the 
following formulation of the principle of epistemological tolerance: 
 
(PET) In a linguistic theory 
(a) contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily 
tolerated,  
(b) in the hope that the later development of the theory will resolve them, and  
(c) in order to protect the theory’s explanatory principles. 
 
However, a couple of decades earlier, in his seminal book first published in 1943, 
which played a decisive role in the development of theoretical linguistics, Louis Hjelmslev 
maintained the opposite view: 
 
“The description shall be free of contradiction (self-consistent), exhaustive, and as 
simple as possible. The requirement of freedom from contradiction takes precedence 
over the requirement of exhaustive description. The requirement of exhaustive 
description takes precedence over the requirement of simplicity.” (Hjelmslev 1969: 
11; emphasis added) 
 
Hjelmslev calls this methodological stance the ‘empirical principle’ but adds that in the light 
of epistemological considerations it may be renamed. For the purposes of the present paper, in 
analogy to the principle of epistemological tolerance, we will call it the principle of 
epistemological intolerance and introduce it as follows:  
 
(PEI) Non-contradiction is the most important methodological requirement of linguistic 
theorising; therefore, contradictions between the data and the hypotheses must not be 
tolerated. 
 
In the case of both extremes, the author considers his own principle to be generally valid for 
the whole of theoretical linguistics. For example, Hjelmslev (1969: 11) maintains that (PEI) 
applies to “every theory”. Chomsky (2002: 101-102), as the above quotation witnesses, 
illustrates (PET) by examples taken from mathematics and emphasises that “what’s true of 
mathematics is going to be true of everything”. (PET) has been applied implicitly in the 
everyday practice of linguistic research, but is also reflected on explicitly in different 
subfields beyond syntax: for example, in word formation and semantics (Botha 1988), in 
phonology (Hale – Reiss 2008), or in historical linguistics (Hale 2007). Therefore – although, 
in order to prepare the problem to be raised in a pointed way, we started from quotations by 
Chomsky and Hjelmslev – the subject matter of the present paper is not restricted to the 
differences between the methodology of Hjelmslev’s glossematics and Chomsky’s generative 
linguistics, but affects the foundations of theoretical linguistics in general.  
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Namely, against the background sketched, the question arises whether theoretical 
linguists should follow (PET) or (PEI). Since this is a metascientific question, it is the 
philosophy of science that is expected to provide points of departure for finding the answer.  
 According to the Analytical Philosophy of Science – which played a decisive role in 
shaping our understanding of scientific inquiry in the 20th century – one pillar of rational 
inquiry is the principle of non-contradiction in the sense of classical two-valued logic which 
says that no statement can be both true and false. Contradictory systems of statements cannot 
be rational, because in such systems any statement can be inferred and therefore they result in 
logical chaos. A scientific theory which includes a contradiction is not able to achieve the 
primary aim of inquiry insofar as it cannot make claims about the world.3 
However, there is also another point of departure, because, as we know, the Analytical 
Philosophy of Science is by now out of date. New developments have systematically rejected 
its tenets. Among others, current trends in the philosophy of science have re-evaluated the 
structure and function of contradictions in scientific theories as well (see e.g. the papers in 
Meheus ed. 2002). First, contradictions may differ with respect to their structure and there are 
different kinds of contradiction. Second, not all contradictions are harmful.  Different kinds of 
contradiction may have different functions in scientific theorising. Third, new systems of 
logic have been elaborated which allow for certain kinds of contradiction without being 
exposed to logical chaos. Such logics are called paraconsistent (for overviews see e.g. Priest 
2002, Priest – Beall – Armour-Garb (eds.) 2004). 
The comparison of these two possible points of departure offered by the philosophy of 
science shows that the question we have raised has no simple answer. Rather, it should be 
reformulated as follows:  
 
(P) What kinds of contradiction between the data and the hypotheses may be tolerated in 
linguistic theories and what kinds must not?  
 
(P) is the central problem of the present paper. However, due to its complexity, we will not be 
able to solve it directly, but we might arrive at its solution by subdividing it into a series of 
more easily accessible sub-problems, the solutions to which will eventually yield the solution 
to (P).  
 Since ‘contradiction’ is a logical category, as a first step we have to find a logic 
capable of modelling different kinds of contradiction between the data and the hypotheses. 
Thus, the first sub-problem is as follows:  
 
(P1) What logic is capable of providing a solution to (P)? 
 
As the solution to (P1), in Section 2 we will outline a logic which distinguishes between 
strong and weak contradiction. After having briefly discussed the logic to be applied, we will 
have to decide whether the principle of epistemological tolerance can be re-interpreted as one 
or both of these kinds of contradiction. Accordingly, the second sub-problem is:  
 
                                                            
3 See for example: 
“The requirement of consistency plays a special role among the various requirements which a theoretical system, 
or an axiomatic system, must satisfy. It can be regarded as the first of the requirements to be satisfied by every 
theoretical system, be it empirical or non-empirical. […] the importance of the requirement of consistency will 
be appreciated if one realizes that a self-contradictory system is uninformative. It is so because any conclusion 
we please can be derived from it. Thus no statement is singled out, either as incompatible or as derivable, since 
all are derivable.” (Popper 1980 [1959]: 91-92; emphasis as in the original) 
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(P2) Can the principle of epistemological tolerance be re-interpreted as the tolerance of 
weak contradiction between the data and the hypotheses? 
 
In Section 3 we will discuss a case study which serves to illustrate that the answer to this 
question is: yes. As the next step, the third sub-problem will be raised:  
 
(P3) Can the principle of epistemological tolerance be re-interpreted as the tolerance of 
strong contradiction between the data and the hypotheses? 
 
Section 4 will be devoted to a case study, too, which, however, will show that the solution to 
(P3) is: no.  
 The solutions to the sub-problems (P1)-(P3) will lead to the solution of our basic 
problem (P) in Section 5. Nevertheless, the solution thus obtained raises a new problem, the 
far-reaching methodological consequences of which will be dealt with in Section 6. 
 Before tackling the first sub-problem, a terminological remark must be made. To avoid 
misunderstandings, it is worth clarifying in what sense we will use the notion of 
grammaticality judgment as a data type. Consider (1): 
 
(1) (a) The sentence 
It is unclear what shocked whom 
is grammatically correct. 
 (b) The sentence  
It is unclear whom what shocked 
is ungrammatical. 
 (c) It is unclear what shocked whom. 
 
The statements in (1)(a) and (b) are data whose source is the introspection of one or more 
informants. Such statements claim about a sentence that it has or has not the property of being 
grammatically correct. The sentence in (1)(c) does not count as a datum. In order to 
emphasise the structure of grammaticality judgments as data, instead of the conventional 
notation which distinguishes between starred sentences marking ungrammaticality and 
unstarred ones standing for grammatical correctness, in the examples we will follow the 
pattern of (1)(a) and (b), and explicitly decompose judgments into a sentence and the property 
‘grammatically correct’/‘ungrammatical’. In this way – since both the data to be discussed 
and the hypotheses at issue are treated as statements, and since, from a logical point of view, 
‘contradiction’ is a relation between statements – it will be legitimate to examine possible 
contradictions between the data and the hypotheses of the theory in question.  
 
 
2.  The solution to (P1): Two kinds of contradiction 
 
The main issue which paraconsistent logics tackle is how, despite the presence of a 
contradiction, logical chaos can be avoided. At present, there are several paraconsistent logics 
available which suggest different approaches to this issue. In order to obtain a solution to 
(P1), we have chosen Rescher – Brandom (1980).4  
 Rescher and Brandom’s logic presupposes a Kripke-semantics which the authors 
modify in two respects, among others. The first modification, which is important from the 
                                                            
4 See Kertész (2004) for another application of Rescher – Brandom (1980) to linguistics. 
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point of view of our problem (P), is the introduction of the operation of superposition on the 
set of possible worlds.  
 
(2) The superposition of the possible world w1 and w2 is a possible world w in which a 
statement p is true if and only if it is true either in w1 or in w2.  
 
In other words, p is true in w1  w2 if and only if it is true at least in one of the component 
worlds. The notation is w1  w2 = w, where ‘ ’ stands for the operation of superposition. See 
the truth-table below. 
 
p is true in w1  p is true in w2 p is true in  
w = w1  w2 
+ + + 
+ – + 
– + + 
– – – 
 
Table 1 
 
As a result of (2), in w it may be the case that both p and ~p are true – however, 
separately in the two different component-worlds of w. p & ~p is not true in w because it is 
neither true in w1, nor in w2.5  
The second modification applies to the semantic interpretation of the valid inference 
principle of classical logic. The latter says:  
 
(3)  p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q 
 
(3) is ambiguous, because it can be interpreted semantically in two different ways. According 
to the first, a valid inference can be obtained if the premises are distributively true:  
 
(4) If 
(a) p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q is a valid inference principle of classical logic, and 
(b) p1 is true in w, p2 is true in w, ..., pn is true in w,  
then 
(c) q is true in w. 
 
The second way to interpret (3) semantically requires that the premises should be 
conjunctively true:  
 
(5) If 
(a) p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q is a valid inference principle of classical logic, and 
(b) p1 & p2 & ... & pn is true in w,  
then 
(c) q is true in w. 
 
(4) allows that p and ~p serve as premises in an inference and, accordingly, logical chaos may 
emerge. However, since statements contradicting each other cannot be conjunctively true, (5) 
does not permit inferences from contradictory premises. Therefore, Rescher and Brandom 
                                                            
5 ‘&’ stands for the logical constant ‘conjunction’ and ‘~’ for ‘negation’. 
The ‘Galilean style in science’ and the inconsistency of linguistic theorising 
  7
reject the distributive semantic interpretation of the valid inference principle of classical logic 
and accept the conjunctive interpretation in (5).  
 (2) and (5) jointly facilitate the distinction between two kinds of contradiction.  
A contradiction is called weak if two requirements are met. First, in a possible world w 
such that w1  w2 = w, both p and ~p may be true; thereby, p is true in w1 and ~p is true in w2 
or vice versa. That is, the statements contradicting each other obtain in different possible 
worlds – among different conditions, in different contexts, against different background 
assumptions. Second, since p and ~p must not be used simultaneously as the premises of 
inferences, logical chaos can be avoided at the outset.  
In contrast, we will speak of strong contradiction if these two requirements are not 
met. The notion of strong contradiction corresponds to the notion of contradiction in classical 
logic (Rescher – Brandom 1980: 15-26). 
 Accordingly, we obtain the following solution to (P1):  
 
(SP1)   (a) The logic as characterised by (2) and (5) is capable of solving (P), because it 
distinguishes between two kinds of contradiction. 
(b) Weak contradiction is harmless, while strong contradiction is harmful. 
 
Our next task is to apply (SP1) to the principle of epistemological tolerance. Since (PET) 
neither excludes its interpretation as the tolerance of weak, nor as that of strong contradiction, 
we have to examine cases of both kinds of contradiction in theoretical linguistics.6  
 
 
3. The solution to (P2): A case study 
 
We will illustrate the solution to (P2) by an instructive case study focusing on Zubizarreta’s 
(1982) seminal contribution to Government-Binding Theory. Among others, Zubizarreta 
analyses the syntactic properties of Spanish verbs like poder (modal verb meaning ‘can’, ‘able 
to’, ‘may’) in sentences such as (6):  
 
(6)  Juan  puede  visitar  a  María. 
John  can  visit  to  Mary. 
‘John can visit Mary’ 
 
Zubizarreta asks the following question:  
 
(7) Is poder a main verb or a non-main verb in Spanish? 
 
In order to answer (7), Zubizarreta (1982: 135-141) applies a series of tests. For example, one 
of the tests examines how poder behaves with respect to null complement anaphora.7 Below 
A1 stands for a set of data made use of in the test. A1 includes, among others, the following 
grammaticality judgments:  
 
                                                            
6 From this point on we will use the term ‘contradiction’ without an attribute in the sense ‘either strong or weak 
contradiction’ in order to refer to cases in which it has not yet been decided whether the relation between two 
statements rests on strong or weak contradiction.  
7 “Null complement anaphora refers to an elliptical construction in which a VP or IP complement of a verb is 
dropped. What is omitted can normally be understood from the preceding clause or context. 
(1.9) (a) They asked him to pay at least lip-service to the principle, but he refused.” (Huang 2000: 5). 
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A1 =  (a) The sentence  
  Juan  podría  visitar  a  María   y  Pedro  también   podría […]. 
  John  could  visit to  Mary     and  Peter also   could […]. 
  ‘John could visit Mary and Peter could also’. 
  is grammatically correct.  
 (b) The sentence 
Juan  ha  visitad  a María y  Pedro  también  ha […]. 
  John  has  visited  to Mary  and  Peter  also   has […]. 
‘John has visited Mary and Peter did also.’ 
  is ungrammatical. 
 
The datum in (a) judges as grammatically correct the sentence in which both clauses include 
poder and the second clause contains null complement anaphora. If, however, instead of 
poder the auxiliary haber appears in the same positions, then, as witnessed by (b), the 
sentence is ungrammatical. From such data Zubizarreta infers the generalisation that poder 
behaves like main verbs and unlike auxiliaries in that it permits null complement anaphora. 
Thus, A1 supports the hypothesis H1:  
 
H1 =  Poder is a main verb. 
 
Another test concerns clitics. In the test Zubizarreta used the set of data A2: 
 
A2 =  (a) The sentence 
  Pedro le    pudo      hablar personalmente.  
  Peter DAT.CL  could     to.talk personally. 
‘Peter could talk personally.’ 
  is grammatically correct. 
 (b) The sentence  
  Pedro le   prometió  hablar   personalmente. 
  Peter  DAT.CL       promised  to.talk    personally. 
  ‘Peter promised to talk personally.’ 
  is ungrammatical.  
 
The generalisation the data in A2 suggest is: In contrast to main verbs, poder allows 
cliticisation. Therefore, A1 supports the hypothesis H2:  
 
H2 = Poder is a non-main verb. 
 
If we compare A1, A2, H1 and H2, then it will be easy to realise that the result of 
Zubizarreta’s argumentation is contradictory. Namely, A1 and A2 are distinct and there is no 
criterion on the basis of which H1 or H2 could be rejected. Accordingly, in the theory there 
are three contradictory pairs of statements. First, the data in A1 contradict the hypothesis H2. 
Second, the data in A2 contradict the hypothesis H1. Third, H1 and H2 also contradict each 
other.8  
 Against the background of (PET) and (PEI), one might think that there are two 
alternative ways to restore the consistency of the theory. In accordance with (PET), one way 
is to decide either for H1 or for H2 and to discard the other. At the same time, the data 
supporting the hypothesis chosen are retained while those contradicting it are, though 
                                                            
8 Please note that both a datum in the sense introduced in Section 1 and hypotheses are statements. Therefore, 
from a logical point of view, it is fully legitimate to speak of a contradiction between them. 
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registered, not integrated into the theory. The other way is to follow (PEI): to deem the theory 
unworkable. However, Zubizarreta (1982: 161) suggested a third option. She assigned two 
parallel structures to the sentence in (6) and represented the double structure of the sentence 
by a double-tree. In (8) the structure S-1 corresponds to H1 and the the structure S-2 to H2. 9 
 
(8) 
 
 
(8) yields the following answer to the question asked in (7):  
 
(9) The two structures corresponding to H1 and H2 are simultaneously present, but under 
different conditions. 
 
After we have briefly summarised Zubizarreta’s argumentation, in accordance with the sub-
problem raised in (P2) now we have to examine how to reconstruct (9) with the help of the 
logic introduced in Section 2.  
 It is easy to observe that (9) meets the requirements defining weak contradiction. First, 
as we have seen, H1 and H2 rest on different conditions. In certain cases – e.g. if there is no 
clitic – poder behaves in accordance with H1; in other cases – e.g. if there is a clitic – 
according to H2; but under the same conditions it never behaves in both ways. Second, the 
conjunction of H1 and H2 is true neither with respect to A1 nor to A2. Consequently, logical 
chaos can be avoided.   
 Thus, the relationship between H1 and H2 as put forward in (9) can be reconstructed 
as follows:  
 
(10) (a) Let H1 and H2 be given. 
(b)  H1 and H2 are incompatible.  
(c) Let us assume that w1  w2 = w, where w is the whole of Zubizarreta’s theory. 
(d) w1 includes A1 and w2 includes A2.  
(e) Since H1 is consistent with A1, but contradicts A2, H1 will be true in w1 and 
false in w2. Since H2 is consistent with A2, but contradicts A1, H2 will be true 
in w2 and false in w1. 
(f) Both H1 and H2 are true in w, because each of them is true in one of the 
component worlds of w. However, H1 & H2 is false in w1, in w2, and, 
therefore, in w too, because neither w1 nor w2 includes both H1 and H2. 
 
Accordingly, Zubizarreta’s theory constitutes a paraconsisent system. What solution to the 
sub-problem (P2) does this finding suggest?  
 Since (SP1) says that weak contradiction is harmless, and in (10) Zubizarreta’s theory 
was reconstructed as a paraconsistent system that tolerates weak contradiction, we obtain the 
following solution to (P2): 
 
                                                            
9 Zubizarreta (1982: 160-174) characterises poder and similar verbs as syntactic affixes which modify their 
verbal complement. However, this is not relevant for our line of reasoning. 
S-1 [S1  NP1 [VP      V1  [S2    NP2 [VP  V2    NP3]]]]  
     Juani           puede            ei          visitar    a  María 
S-2 [S   NP1  [VP [V VAffix  +   V]                NP3 ]] 
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(SP2) The principle of epistemological tolerance is acceptable if it is re-interpreted as the 
tolerance of weak contradiction.  
 
In what respects does the re-interpretation differ from PET?  
 The first component of (PET) concerns the treatment of data contradicting the 
hypotheses of the theory at issue. According to (PET)(a), the tolerance of contradictions 
means that the counterexamples “should be carefully noted, but it is often rational to put them 
aside […]” (Chomsky 1980a: 2) – that is, such data should be temporarily excluded from the 
theory. In contrast, if the relationship between the counterexamples and the hypotheses is 
interpreted as weak contradiction, then it will be possible to integrate these data into the 
theory.  
 The second component of (PET) is the relationship between the development of the 
theory and the resolution of the contradiction. On the one hand, as witnessed by (9), (SP1) is 
compatible with (PET) insofar as the consequences of strong contradiction can be avoided 
“pending further study” (Chomsky 1980a: 2) i.e. the later development of the theory. On the 
other hand, unlike (PET), the re-interpretation suggests that the later development of the 
theory does not lead to consistency in the sense of classical logic, but to weak contradiction.   
 The third element of (PET) is the protection of the theory’s explanatory power 
(“principles of a certain degree of explanatory power”, Chomsky 1980a: 2). On the one hand, 
in the sense of (PET)(c) the protection of explanatory principles means that despite the 
emergence of a contradiction, the theory must not be given up. Rather, one of the two 
contradicting sets of data, together with the corresponding hypothesis, has to be retained, 
while the other must be “put aside” (ibid.). However, then the data “put aside” will remain 
unexplained, because the hypothesis explaining them is dropped, too. On the other hand, as 
(9) shows, the re-interpretation proposed in (SP2) protects the explanatory principles of the 
theory in another way: as a result of the fact that the relationship between contradicting 
hypotheses is interpreted as weak contradiction, both data sets can be explained, because both 
hypotheses – in the case study H1 and H2 – are retained.  
 The fourth component is the fertility of the principle of epistemological tolerance. On 
the one hand, Chomsky (2002: 102) considers the tolerance of contradictions between the data 
and the hypotheses “quite a big step”. (PET) is indeed more progressive than the naïve 
falsificationism of (PEI), which would require the abandonment of even the workable parts of 
a theory if a contradiction emerges. On the other hand, in the case study the “big step” was 
that in Zubizarreta’s theory the tolerance of weak contradiction functioned as an effective 
heuristic tool, because it led to an acceptable answer to the question in (7), whereas (PET) 
could not have achieved this. The reason why we chose Zubizarreta (1982) as the object of the 
case study is that it was the first work to make use of double trees. Further applications of this 
theoretical tool justified the heuristic fertility of weak contradiction, because double trees 
were successfully applied in a series of later theory versions (see e.g. Baltin 1987, É. Kiss 
1987, Saddock 1991, Zubizarreta 1987; see also Moravcsik 2006: 45-61, 2010).10 
 
 
4. The solution to (P3): A case study 
 
The solution to sub-problem (P3) will be exemplified by a case study on Haider (2009).  
 Since Chomsky (1973) – in various frameworks, using a great variety of techniques – 
the literature has continuously discussed the question of under what conditions the wh-subject 
may remain in situ and under what conditions it has to be fronted in different languages. In 
                                                            
10 Nevertheless, it goes without saying that despite the heuristic fertility of the tolerance of weak contradiction 
the desideratum of consistency as a regulative principle of linguistic theory formation must not be given up. 
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one of his contributions to the debate on the nature of linguistic data, Haider (2009: 80) 
mentions the following examples in which what is the wh-subject and whom the wh-object:  
 
(11) (a) The sentence 
  It is unclear what shocked whom 
  is grammatically correct. 
(b) The sentence 
 It is unclear whom what shocked 
 is ungrammatical.  
 
Haider (2009: 80) formulates the hypothesis supported by (11) in a very simplified form as 
follows:11 
 
(12) In English a wh-subject must not remain in situ. 
 
However, the German data are different from those in (11): 
 
(13) (a) The sentence 
  Es ist  unklar, was   wen   schockierte 
  It  is  unclear  what-SBJ who-OBJ shocked 
  ‘It is unclear what shocked whom.’ 
  is grammatically correct.  
 (b)  The sentence  
  Es  ist  unklar,  wen   was   schockierte 
  It  is  unclear  who-OBJ what-SBJ  shocked 
  ‘It is unclear what shocked whom.’ 
  is grammatically correct. 
                                                            
11 It may be useful to explain briefly in what sense generative linguists assume that the wh-subject in the 
sentence in (11)(a) does not remain in situ but has to be fronted by wh-movement. For example, using the 
framework of Government-Binding-Theory, Haegeman 1994: 398) analyses the sentence 
 
Who will arrive first? 
 
according to the „vacuous movement hypothesis” as follows:  
 
[CP Whoi [IP ti will arrive first]]? 
 
That is, „who” has been moved from IP to CP leaving behind the trace ti coindexed with it. Haegeman 
elucidates the vacuous movement hypothesis by maintaining that „[…] the effect of short movement […] cannot 
be observed on the surface string, ti having no phonetic content. Movement transformations whose effects cannot 
be observed are referred to as instances of vacuous movement”. Then, in this framework, Haider’s example in 
(11)(a) could be analysed in the following way (for the analysis of an analogous example see Haegeman 1994: 
508): 
 
It is unclear [CP whati [IP ti shocked whom]] 
 
Here the wh-subject has been moved from IP to CP, too. Although the technical details of the analysis 
have changed continuously, despite serious counter-arguments (see e.g. Chomsky 1986), the transformational 
analysis of such structures has been widely accepted.  
For the technical discussion of the hypothesis in (12) in the framework of Chomsky’s Minimalist 
Program, see Haider (2004, 2005, 2011, and the literature cited there). The technical details of the analyses of the 
data like in (11) within different versions of generative grammar are not relevant for the point to be made in this 
paper. 
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The hypothesis is:   
 
(14) In German a wh-subject may remain in situ.  
 
The generalisation is:  
 
(15) In English the relationship between the in-situ position of the wh-subject and that of 
the wh-object is asymmetric, while in German it is symmetric.  
 
In the literature there have been several attempts to explain the generalisation in (15). 
Haider’s suggestion connects (15) with the syntactic types of languages. Presupposing that the 
basic word order in English is VO and in German OV, he puts forward the following 
assumption (Haider 2004, 2009: 79):  
 
(16) In VO languages the relationship between the in-situ position of the wh-subject and 
that of the wh-object is asymmetric, while in OV languages it is symmetric.  
 
Among others, from (16) it follows that in analogy to German, further OV languages, such as 
for example Dutch, permit that the wh-subject remains in situ. However, as Haider (2009: 79) 
reports, Gisbert Fanselow questioned (16). To support his criticism of a preliminary version of 
Haider (2004), he sent a questionnaire to 22 native Dutch linguists asking them to judge the 
grammaticality of 10 sentences containing wh-subjects and -objects in different constructions. 
The result was that in a series of relevant cases the informants did not judge these sentences 
unanimously. Let us illustrate the situation by the examples in (17)-(18). 
 The Dutch sentences in which the wh-subject does not remain in situ are 
grammatically correct according to all informants: 
 
(17) The sentence 
 Ik  weet  niet  wie   wat   gekocht  heeft 
 I  know  not  who-SBJ  what-OBJ  bought  has 
 ‘I don’t know who bought what’ 
 is grammatically correct.  
 
But according to some of the informants, the wh-subject may also remain in situ, while 
others judge such sentences ungrammatical: 
 
(18) (a)   The sentence  
  Ik  weet  niet  wat   wie  gekocht  heeft  
  I  know  not   what-OBJ  who-SBJ  bought  has 
  ‘I don’t know who bought what’ 
  is grammatically correct. 
 (b) The sentence  
 Ik  weet  niet  wat  wie  gekocht heeft 
 I  know  not  what-OBJ  who-SBJ  bought  has 
 ‘I don’t know who bought what’ 
 is ungrammatical. 
 
The contradiction between (18)(a) and (b) is seemingly trivial, because it merely illustrates 
the everyday experience of linguists that there may be differences in the informants’ 
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judgements of the same sentences. But Haider (2009: 80) draws non-trivial conclusions from 
this commonplace experience: the two judgments in (18)(a) and (b) cannot be maintained 
simultaneously, but the theory is not capable of deciding between them, either, and this 
undermines the workability of the theory.  
 Why does the simple problem illustrated in (18) lead to such a devastating conclusion? 
We will answer this question by applying the logic introduced in Section 2.  
 Let us assume that the set of data A1 includes (17) and (18)(a), that is A1 = {(17), 
(18)(a)}. Then the data in A1 will support the hypothesis H1:  
 
H1 = In Dutch the wh-subject may remain in situ. 
 
However, nothing speaks against deciding for the data set A2 = {(17), (18)(b)}. Accordingly, 
the grammaticality judgments in A2 will support H2: 
 
H2 = In Dutch the wh-subject must not remain in situ. 
 
It is easy to realise that three contradictions emerge. The data in A1 contradict H2; those in A2 
contradict H1; and there is a contradiction between H1 and H2, too.  
 Thus,the situation appears to be similar to the first case study. However, this 
impression is incorrect, for the following reason.  
 In the first case study it was not the contradictory evaluation of the grammaticality of 
the sentences at issue that triggered the two contradicting hypotheses. Rather, there the two 
hypotheses were supported by tests which yielded two distinct sets of conditions. The 
grammaticality judgments pertaining to the Spanish sentences were free of contradiction at 
the outset.  
 In contrast, in the Dutch examples it was the same sentence the grammaticality of 
which was judged contradictorily and it was the same source – namely the native speakers’ 
introspection – which the judgments stemmed from. Therefore, the relation between A1 and 
A2 is contradictory, too. As regards the contradiction between H1 and H2, it is not possible to 
reconstruct it as weak contradiction, because the two hypotheses cannot be associated with 
two different possible worlds which represent two different sets of conditions and which are 
connected by superposition. Thus, the relation between H1 and H2 is strongly contradictory 
(self-contradictory).  
 Consequently, the logical reconstruction of the above example is as follows:  
 
(19) (a) Let H1, H2, A1 and A2 be given. 
 (b) H1 and H2, as well as A1 and A2 are incompatible, respectively. 
 (c) Let w be the possible world representing the theory. 
(d) In w both the grammaticality judgments included in A1 and those included in 
A2 are true. 
(e) H1 is true in w, because it is consistent with A1, and H2 is true, too, because it 
is consistent with A2. 
 (f) Therefore, the conjunction of H1 and H2 can be inferred in w. 
 (g) Therefore, w is strongly inconsistent. 
 
Now we are able to answer the question of why the problem which (18) raised leads to 
devastating consequences. Our answer is that Haider’s conclusion seems to refer to the logical 
chaos which has been triggered by strong contradiction and which the theory cannot handle. 
Accordingly, the following solution to the sub-problem (P3) suggests itself:  
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(SP3) The principle of epistemological tolerance is not acceptable if it is re-interpreted as the 
tolerance of strong contradiction. 
 
If the relationship between Dutch data and the hypotheses at issue makes the theory strongly 
contradictory and this relationship leads to the destructive consequences mentioned, then the 
next question we should ask is: What is responsible for the emergence of strong 
contradiction? Although Haider does not use the terminology of the logic we introduced in 
Section 2 and does not raise this question, either, the answer can be found in his paper:  
 
“The theoreticians must acknowledge that the practice that proved successful in the 
pioneering phase of the past decades, namely introspection and eclectic feed-back 
from informants, has reached its limits.” (Haider 2009: 97; emphasis added) 
 
The rhetoric of this quotation witnesses a significant change of perspective. First, in 
accordance with the present methodological presuppositions of theoretical linguistics as well 
as the principle of epistemological tolerance (PET), Haider ought to have said that it is the 
theory’s technical apparatus that decides whether (18)(a) or (18)(b) should be accepted. 
Thereby, it should be admitted that the set of data strongly contradicting that set of data which 
has been decided for cannot be explained until the later development of the theory makes its 
explanation possible. As opposed to this, in the quotation Haider questions the adequacy of 
the data source and the data type on which the findings of the theory have been based so far. 
Second, theoretical linguists continuously encounter problems similar to (18) without, 
however, being deterred from the application of the theory. Haider’s sophisticated reflection 
on a problem which in the linguists’ everyday practice has been unreflectingly considered to 
be trivial signals a basic change of perspective, too. Namely, this reflection has immediately 
revealed that in reality the problem at issue is non-trivial in a way and to an extent which 
substantially undermine the effectiveness of linguistic theorising. 
 Consequently, the question to be asked is how strong contradiction of the kind 
reconstructed in (19) can be avoided. The answer is: If strong contradiction must not be 
tolerated and the reason why strong contradiction obtains is the uncertainty of introspection as 
a data source and grammaticality judgements as a data type, then this data source and this data 
type have to be changed in order to avoid strong contradiction. Accordingly, the next question 
is: How? 
 The first possibility is to use another data source instead of introspection. Haider 
suggests the replacement of introspection by instrumental experiments. But Haider’s answer 
is not convincing. One reason is that, although it is indeed the case that theoretical linguistics 
relying on data stemming from introspection has reached its limits, the complete rejection of 
the latter would lead to discarding many of the seminal findings of the past decades. 
Moreover, just like the use of the native speakers’ intuition, even the results of instrumental 
experiments can be interpreted differently, and, what is more, may lead to contradictions, too. 
Finally, one of the most important insights which current debates on linguistic data and 
evidence have yielded is that despite the uncertainty and the unreliability of introspection, no 
other data source is workable without making at least partial use of the latter.12 Neither in 
corpus linguistics nor in experimental linguistics can introspection be entirely dispensed with.  
 Therefore, the second option should be considered seriously: the application of several 
different data sources – such as corpora, different kinds of experiments, and introspection – 
and the integration of several different data types – such as search results, the results of 
experiments and grammaticality judgments. The outcome of recent discussions seems to 
                                                            
12 See the literature referred to in Section 1. 
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support this conclusion independently of our above reasoning. For example, Schlesewsky 
(2009: 177) maintains that  
 
“the key to gaining new insights in the future and the hope of finding more adequate 
models of language, whether in psycho-/neurolinguistics or in linguistic theory, lies 
solely in the interaction and the combination of [data processing] methods.” (My 
translation, A.K.) 
 
This rhetoric refers to a change of perspective, too, but in a different way from Haider’s. Like 
Haider, Schlesewsky also draws attention to the fact that current models of language are not 
adequate; however, he concludes that the tool for making them more adequate is the 
integration of different data types obtained by the application of different data processing 
methods. 
 
 
5. The solution to (P) 
 
With the above solution to (P3) we have reached an important turning point in our line of 
argumentation. Namely, the consequences of the principle of epistemological tolerance as 
revealed by its logical reconstruction yielded two important findings which are considerably 
different from what (PET) maintains. Among others, (PET) claims that the contradictions 
between the data and the hypotheses can be avoided by the future refinement of the theory. As 
opposed to this, the first case study illustrated that in certain cases – due to the immediate 
refinement of the theory and the use of all the data at one’s disposal – the relationship between 
the data and the hypotheses can be represented as weak contradiction. In addition, the second 
case study has shown that in particular cases strong contradiction can be avoided by the 
extension of data sources and data types. Thus, we have to realise that it is not only the 
theory’s further refinement through which the destructive consequences of strong 
contradiction can be avoided, but also through transgressing the limits of introspection and 
grammaticality judgments by a more subtle reflection on the nature of data. Accordingly, we 
obtain the following characterisation of the current state of the art in theoretical linguistics:  
 At present, in theoretical linguistics there is a significant shift of focus in progress. 
While the past decades have been theory-oriented insofar as the continuous revision of the 
technical details of theory formation was focused on, and the peculiarities of the data have not 
been the subject of special interest, today a data-oriented perspective seems to be emerging. 
This perspective centres on the re-definition and re-structuring of data sources as well as the 
integration of data types. 
 Now we are in a position to infer the solution to our starting problem (P) from the 
solutions to the sub-problems (SP1)-(SP3):  
 
(SP) Theoretical linguistics 
(a) may tolerate weak contradiction between the data and the hypotheses, but must 
not tolerate strong contradiction; and 
(b) requires the consideration of new data sources and the integration of data types 
stemming from different data sources. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Let us look back at our reasoning. We raised (P), which is a relevant foundational 
problem of theoretical linguistics. We subdivided (P) into three sub-problems, solved the sub-
problems one by one, and from their solutions inferred the solution to (P). Accirdingly, we 
carried out the task we set in Section 1.  
 However, although at first sight (SP) convincingly follows from previous steps in our 
line of reasoning, in its above form it is not acceptable. Namely, it includes the desideratum of 
a more sophisticated treatment of data sources and data types than has been practiced in 
theoretical linguistics so far, but it does not clarify how such a desideratum can be met. The 
present methodology of theoretical linguistics is not compatible with (SP)(b). This 
methodology – which assumes introspection to be the main data source and grammaticality 
judgments to be the main data type – obviously does not include the heuristics that should be 
applied in order to answer the following open questions closely related to the desideratum 
mentioned in (SP)(b): 
 
(20) (a) How can the contradictions between hypotheses supported by different data 
types which go back to different data sources be accounted for?  
(b) What argumentation strategies should be applied in order to make decisions 
between alternative hypotheses supported by different data types and different 
data sources? 
(c) By what argumentation strategies should former decisions be re-evaluated in 
the light of data sources considered later? 
(d) How does the consideration of new of data sources and the integration of data 
types affect the details of the theoretical framework?  
 
Thus, by raising these open questions we have arrived at the final conclusion of the present 
paper: theoretical linguistics needs a new methodology. The data-oriented perspective 
requires the elaboration of new strategies of theory formation. Therefore, (SP) has to be 
modified as follows:  
 
(SP’) Theoretical linguistics 
(a) may tolerate weak contradiction between the data and the hypotheses, but must 
not tolerate strong contradiction; 
(b) requires the consideration of new data sources and the integration of data types 
stemming from different data sources, 
and 
(c) also requires the development of a new methodology for theoretical linguistics 
compatible with (a) and (b). 
 
The most important task for theoretical linguistics to be accomplished in the future is to make 
serious attempts at the substantial renewal of its methodological foundations.13 
 
                                                            
13 According to Schlesewsky (2009: 177), there is no methodology at our disposal capable of integrating 
different data types and considering different data sources. However, Kertész – Rákosi (in press) explicitly 
tackles questions like those in (20). Its aim is to reveal the new heuristics of linguistic data processing mentioned 
in (20) which can be directly applied to linguistic problem solving. 
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